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LIQUOR VENDOR LIABILITY FOR INJURIES CAUSED BY INTOXICATED
PATRONS-A QUESTION OF POLICY
Since the repeal of Prohibition in 1933 the liquor business has been
one of the most closely regulated industries in this country. Most states
devote an entire chapter of their statutory code to liquor control, and the
federal government exercises further regulation through a liquor excise
taxation scheme. No other category of consumer products is subject to
the level of direct legislative regulation that i; confronted by the liquor
business.
Nevertheless, during the past fifteen years a number of courts have
decided that the statutory controls on the liquor industry at the retail level
are not sufficient to protect the public from the evils of intoxication, and
have looked to the common law for additional constraints. The motiva-
tion behind this search has come from the frequency and severity of auto-
mobile accidents caused by intoxicated drivers.' Because courts must deal
with the grisly consequences of intoxicated drivers in the tort suits which
follow the accidents, they are more likely than the legislatures to directly
confront situations in which it would seem desirable to impose tort lia-
bility on a liquor vendor for injuries caused to a third party by an intoxi-
cated person.
However, the common law has traditionally been that an injury to a
third party caused by an intoxicated person is not actionable against the
vendor who sold liquor to the intoxicated person because the sale was
only a remote, and not a proximate, cause of the injury.' This common
law rule has arisen from the normative assumption that a person should
not be able to relieve himself from responsibility for his acts by becoming
intoxicated, 3 and from the further assumption that it is not a tort to sell
liquor to an able-bodied man, since the liquor vending business is legiti-
mate and the purchaser is deemed to be responsible..4
1 Note that in most of the cases discussed infra the injuries complained of were sustained
in automobile accidents.
2The consumption of the liquor is usually considered to be the proximate cause of
the injury. Mason v. Roberts, 33 Ohio St. 2d 29, 33, 294 N.E.2d 884, 887 (1973); Chris.
toff v. Gradsky, 140 N.E.2d 586 (Ohio C.P. 1956); Cahn, New Common Law Dramshop
Rule, 9 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 302 (1960). Although the precise origination of this proximate
cause rule denying vendor liability is uncertain, the principle can be seen as early as 1793
in Ashley v. Harrison, 1 Peake 194, 3 Rev. Rep. 686 (K.3. 1793), a libel action dismissed
because the alleged injury was held too remote from the alleged wrongful act. Lord Kenyon
stated: "If this action is to be maintained, I know not to what extent the rule may be
carried. For aught I can see to the contrary, it may equally be supported against every
man who circulates the glass too freely, and intoxicates an actor, by which he is rendered
incapable of performing his part on the stage."
3 W. PRossEm, THE LAW OF ToRTs § 32 (4th ed. 1971).
4 This principle is succinctly stated in Meade v. Freeman, 462 P.2d 54 (Idaho 1969),
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The logical premises on which this limitation of proximate cause was
based during the nineteenth century have not changed. 5  Intoxicated per-
sons are still legally responsible for their acts, liquor vending is still a
legitimate business, and the consumption of liquor is still closer to the in-
jury than the sale in the chain of causation. What has changed is the
amount of damage that intoxicated persons can and do inflict on society
because of the automobile, damage which in some cases exceeds in amount
the ability of the intoxicated tortfeasor to compensate. This problem is
especially acute in states which do not require motorists to carry liability
insurance, or which permit drivers to carry unrealistically low limits on
liability insurance.6 The tavern is a going concern, itself a valuable asset
capable of generating income, and likely to carry liability insurance. A
tavern would thus appear to have a "deeper pocket" than the intoxicated
tortfeasor to pay a judgment. In addition, the increased danger posed to
society by an intoxicated person may call for the imposition of a higher
standard of care on the part of a liquor vendor, a duty to ensure that his
patrons do not drink so much as to become a hazard to society.- Enforce-
ment of this duty can only be achieved by putting aside the traditional
rule that the vendor's sale is a remote cause of the injury, if a tort action
is to be the means of enforcement. Thus the need for vendor liability for
injuries caused by intoxicated patrons is a policy issue arising from the in-
creased danger to society which an intoxicated person behind the wheel
of an automobile represents.
The policy arguments do not all favor the imposition of common law
in an opinion whIich is perhaps the most articulate recent statement opposing common law
vendor liability.
5 Cf. Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959); in overruling the limitation
of proximate cause, the court fails to address any of the premises on which proximate
cause was based, but rather, relying upon policy arguments and upon statutory construction
of other states' dram shop acts, concludes that other states have by court decision already
abrogated the common law limitation of proximate cause.
G For example, in Ohio insurance agents may refuse to underwrite a policy to a person
known to drink, or who has had traffic violations. That person must then apply to the
state's insurance commission to become an "assigned risk," wherein he is assigned to an
insuror who must give him insurance. The insurer will only write liability insurance for
him in the lowest legal amount, S12,500/25,000-an amount obviously insufficient to cover
an accident involving serious injuries. Assigned risk policies operate from a separate pool;
thus the cost of insuring assigned risk drivers is not shared among all drivers, but only
among assigned risk drivers. It must be said in defense of the low statutory limits on
assigned risk policies that if the required limits were higher, no assigned risk driver could
afford to purchase insurance, since the insurers would have to charge tremendous rates to
cover claims. The alternative of placing the high risk drivers in the general pool with
higher liability limits, thus requiring all motorists to pay for the cost of assigned risk drivers
is generally viewed by the public as unjust to the careful motorist. See OHIO REV. CODE
§§ 4509.51, 4509.70 (1973); Massar, The Assigned Risk Plan for Allocetion of Certain
Insurance Risks, 15 OHIO ST. LJ. 172 (1954).
7 The difficulty of articulating this duty in language which states a practical standard
of conduct will be addressed later in this paper.
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liability for negligence upon a vendor. The difficulty of defining the duty
or standard of conduct to which the vendor is to be held, the unpredicta-
bility of the conduct of an intoxicated person, the fact that the allocation
of damage costs to different classes of defendant's is a policy question best
left to legislative judgment, and the basic inefficiency of negligence ac-
tions in compensating injuries are factors which support the position that
the proper resolution of the issue should be legislative in form.
Recently the Ohio Supreme Court in Mason v. Roberts' examined the
question whether common law vendor liability should be established in
Ohio. Roger Lee Roberts entered the Corner Bar in Ashland, Ohio, dur-
ing the afternoon of October 24, 1969,- and purchased for consumption
various intoxicating drinks until he departed the premises at one o'clock
the following morning. After leaving the premises he proceeded down
the street for about two blocks; where he accosted plaintiff's decedent,
assaulted him, hnd caused fatal injuries. The owner of the Corner Bar,
Dorothy Tester, was Roberts' aunt; consequently, plaintiff alleged in his
complaint that defendant Dorothy Tester knew or should have known
that Roberts was becoming intoxicated and that when intoxicated he
tended to be violent and abusive, but that she nevertheless continued to
serve him intoxicating liquors. Defendant Tester admitted in her answer
that she was the owner of the Corner Bar and Roberts' aunt, denied all
other allegations in the complaint, and moved for summary judgment.
The trial court sustained the motion upon her affidavits showing that
Roberts had not been blacklisted;" however, plaintiff successfully ap-
8 33 Ohio St. 2d 29,294 N.E.2d 884 (1973).
9 OHIo REv. CODE § 4399.01 (1973) establishes liability in tort against a tavern owner
who serves intoxicating liquor to a person who bad been "blacklisted" by the State:
A husband, wife, child, parent, guardian, employer, or other person injured In
person, properzy, or means of support by an intoxicated person, or in consequence
of such intoxication, habitual or otherwise, of a person, after the issuance and dur-
ing the existence of the order of the department of liquor control prohibiting the
sale of intoxicating liquor as defined in section 4301.01 of the Revised Code to
such person, has a right of action in his own name, severally or jointly, against any
person selling or giving intoxicating liquors which cause .such intoxication, in whole
or in part, of such person.
The blacklisting scheme is that the wife, relative, employer, etc. of an habitual drunkard
may notify the department of liquor control that the subject's name should be placed on
the blacklist. A list of persons living in a particular area who have been blacklisted is then
mailed to every liquor vendor in that area. OHIO REV. CODE § 4301.22 (C) provides:
No intoxicating liquor shall be sold to any individual who habitually drinks
intoxicating liquor to excess, or to whom the department has, after investigation,
determined to prohibit the sale of such intoxicating liquor, because of cause shown
by the husband, wife, father, mother, brother, sister, or other person dependent up-
on, or in charge of such individual, or by the mayor of any municipal corporation,
or any township trustee of any township in which the individual resides. The or-
der of the department in such case shall remain in effect until revoked by the de.
partment.
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pealed, obtaining a reversal from the court of appeals. 10 Confronting the
Ohio Supreme Court was a case which seemed a suitable vehicle for estab-
lishing common law liability of a vendor to those injured by intoxicated
patrons. Unfortunately, the law stated in the syllabus of the Mason opin-
ion does not address the facts of the case; whereas the syllabus decares
that there shall be a cause of action for on-premises injuries, the facts in
Mason as pleaded clearly show that the injuries were inflicted off the prem-
ises. Furthermore, the opinion of the court shares with the syllabus the
erroneous assumption that the injury was incurred on the premises. The
court then found liability upon the principle that a proprietor has a duty
to protect business invitees from injury on the premises. The court's
holding can only be characterized as ambiguous as to whether common
law vendor liability has been .established, in Ohio. It is the purpose of
this note to examine the status of common law vendor liability in the
United States, to address the policy questions which t4nderly the issue
whether or not sach ,liability should exist, and to recommend a res6lution
of the Mason ambiguity in light of these questions of policy.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF VENDOR LIABILrIY
Although the traditional common law position has been that no com-
mon law vendor liability exists for injuries to a third party by an intoxi-
cated person, a number of states have established vendor liability by stat-
ute. These statutes, known as Civil Damage Acts, or Dram Shop Acts,
were passed in the latter half of the nineteenth century, and vary in
content from state to state. Generally the statutes purport to provide a
right of action to a person injured by an intoxicated person against the
vendor whose sale caused or contributed to the intoxication of the party
causing the injury. Ohio's blacklisting provision is unusual; most statutes
assign liability to a vendor who unlawfully sells liquor to an intoxicated
person.'1 The language of these statutes indicates a concern on the part
of the legislatures to protect the family of the intoxicated person from in-
jury caused by him or from loss of support caused by the habitual intox-
ication of the breadwinner, although the statutes 4o not limit actions to
family members in most cases.
10 35 Ohio App. 2d 29, 300 N.E.2d 211 (1971).
11 The Ohio statute is zet forth in note 9 supra. A typical non.blacklist dram shop
act is the NEW YORK GENERAL OBLIGATIONS LAW § 11-101 (McKinney 1964) which
reads in part:
Any person who shall be injured in person, property, means of support, or
otherwise by any intoxicated person, or by reason of the intoxication of any person,
whether resulting in his death or not, shall have a right of action against any per-
son who shall, by unlawful selling to or unlawfully assisting in procuring liquor for
such intoxicated person, have caused or contributed to such intoxication; and in any
such action such person shall have a right to recover actual and exemplary damages.
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Dram shop acts have not proven entirely satisfactory for the purpose
of providing adequate compensation for injuries caused by negligent or
unlawful sales of liquor. In Ohio, if the intoxicated person has not been
blacklisted, the victim has no remedy under the statutes. In other states
a statutory limit may be set as to maximum allowable damages which may
be awarded under the dramn shop act, and a short limitation of action pe-
riod often appears. 12  Twenty-nine states have no dram shop act at all.
These limitations have led some courts to consider recognizing a common
law cause of action for such torts.
The orderly development of a common law cause of action began with
two decisions issued in 1959. In Waynick v. Chicago's Last Department
Store'3 the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit de-
cided in a diversity action that a civil remedy was available against a tav-
ernkeeper who sold liquor to an intoxicated person in violation of a crim-
inal statute.' 4  The court held that civil liability was to be imposed in
addition to the statutory criminal penalty of six months imprisonment
and $500 fine maximum. The court found that neither Illinois' nor
Michigan's dram shop act was applicable extraterritorially, a holding that
merely applied an existing rule of law in each of those states.15  Perhaps
the court was moved to find a cause of action by the severity of the acci-
dent, and by the fact that plaintiff would otherwise have been without
remedy solely because defendant crosssed a state line. The court found a
cause of action in the common law of Michigan, though the statutory
duty was imposed upon defendant by the Illinois criminal statute, the
breach of which was found to be the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury.
The New Jersey Supreme Court unequivocally established the common
law tort of unlawfully selling liquor to minors and intoxicated persons in
12 The Illinois dram shop act, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 43 § 135 (Supp. 1973), has such limi.
tations:
In no event shall the judgment or recovery under this Act for injury to the person
or to the property of any person as aforesaid exceed $15,000, and recovery under
this Act for loss of means of support resulting from the death or injury of any
person, as aforesaid, shall not exceed $15,000 for each person so injured where
such injury occurred prior to July 1, 1956, and not exceeding $20,000 for each
person so injured after July 1, 1956. Every action hereunder shall be barred un.
less commenced within one year next after the cause of action accrued.
13269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied sub nom. Saxner v. Waynick, 362 U.S.
903 (1960). Defendants served liquor in Illinois to persons. who drove to Michigan and
injured plaintiffs there.
14ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43 § 131 reads in part: "No licensee . . .or employee
shall sell . . . alcoholic liquor to any . . . intoxicated person or to any person known
by him to be an habitual drunkard..."
1513ldridge v. Don Beachcomber, Inc., 342 Ill. App. 151, 95 N.E.2d 512, 22 A.LR.2d
1123 (Ist Dist. 1950). The supplement to the A.L.R. annotation concerning this case indi-
cates that later cases continue to follow the rule that dram shop acts do not apply extra.
territorially unless they explicitly state that they do.
(Vol, 85
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Rappaport v. Nichols.16 New Jersey did not have a dram shop act. The
court reasoned that in states which do have dram shop acts, the legal con-
clusion that an automobile accident is the proximate result of an illegal
sale is not determined by statute but by common law tort principles of
proximate cause and foreseeability. Therefore even in a state without a
dram shop act, an automobile accident can be held to be a proximate re-
sult of an illegal sale of liquor. According to the court, this is the cru-
cial point at which the common law rationale that injuries are caused by
consumption and not by sale collapses. The effect of a dram shop act is
not to establish that proximate cause may be found in the negligence of a
tavern owner, but to establish strict liability for the proximate results of
an illegal sale. If a dram shop act state holds that an automobile acci-
dent is a proximate result of a sale of liquor, that state has abrogated the
common law rule by judicial decision, not by statute. The court sup-
ported the argument by citing two Pennsylvania cases in which the proxi-
mate cause of auto accidents is traced to a sale of liquor.'1 But the Penn-
sylvania dram shop act (now repealed) was unique in its language; a
person who wrongfully furnished liquor to a minor was liable for injuries
"in consequence of such furnishing." Such language did indeed require
the Pennsylvania courts to abrogate the common law rule in order to hold
that a vendor would be liable to third parties. However, the New Jersey
court went too far in stating that the common law rule "has in effect been
rejected in decisions under Civil Damage Laws which have sustained
findings that the ensuing collisions were the proximate consequences of
the liquor sales."'" The Pennsylvania Civil Damage Law was the only
statute under which such a finding was necessary. The more typical dram
shop act supplies the causal link between vendor and consumer by stat-
ute: "A . . . person injured . . . by an intoxicated person ... has a right
of action . . . against any person selling or giving intoxicating liquors
which cause such intoxication, in whole or in part, of such person.""'
Such statutory language supplies the proximate cause which has tradi-
tionally been held not to exist in the common law.
Having found in the two Pennsylvania cases and in Waynick com-
16 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959). Plaintiff alleged injury in an automobile collision
with a car driven by Nichols, and that Nichols had been served by defendant tavern under
circumstances which constituted knowledge or notice that Nichols was underage and intoxi-
cated.
17 Manning v. Yokas, 389 Pa. 136, 132 A.2d 198 (1957); McKinney v. Foster, 391
Pa. 221, 137 A.2d 502 (1958).
1' 31 N.J. at 196, 156 A.2d at 5.
19 Omo REv. CODE § 4399.01 (blacklisting clause omitted). Similar language is found
in the New York dram shop act quoted in note 11 supra, and in the Illinois dram shop act,
quoted in note 12 supra.
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mon law precedent for extending the chain of proximate cause to the per-
son selling liquor, the Rappaport court needed only to find a test of tor-
tious conduct on which to base a cause of action. That test was the negli-
gence test of whether a reasonably prudent person at the time and place
should foresee an unreasonable risk or likelihood of danger or harm to
others.2 ° More specifically, the question for the jury was whether a ven-
dor who served liquor to a visibly intoxicated person or to a minor should
reasonably foresee that he was creating an unreasonable risk of danger
to others. The court noted that the legislature had already indicated that
such conduct created an unreasonable social risk in the case of minors,
and had thus forbidden sales to minors; the New Jersey Division of Alco-
holic Beverage Control had recognized a similar danger by forbidding
sales to "actually or apparently intoxicated persons." Thus the jury could
reasonably conclude that a tavern owner was negligent in such conduct.
The New Jersey Supreme Court in Rappaport had but a single legal
problem to confront in establishing common law liability: whether to
overrule the common law rule that proximate cause ended with the con-
sumer. Other states having no dram shop acts could establish common
law vendor liability by following Rappaport.2' Courts in states with oper-
ative dram shop acts faced a more difficult legal problem. In order to
establish common law vendor liability, the courts in dram shop act states
would have to overrule a general presumption that their legislatures in
passing dram shop acts had intended to limit liability to the provisions of
the statute, thus "pre-empting the field." Courts in states with dram shop
acts which have confronted the question whether common law vendor lia-
bility coexists -with statutory liability have reached widely different conclu.
sions. Although the differences in the holdings of the courts can be
partly attributed to different fact situations, it is nevertheless apparent
that no single logical sequence of legal principles has emerged to support
common law vendor liability in states with drain shop acts.
A New York court took a direct approach in Berkeley v, Park,"2 not-
ing that since the passing of the dram shop act by the legislature in 1873
no person had ever attempted a common law action in negligence against
a vendor. The court noted that nothing in the statute purported to ex-
20 31 N.J. at 201, 156 A.2d at 8.
21 These states did so: Cal.: Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623, 486
P.2d 151 (1971); Fla.: Davis v. Schiappacossee, 155 So. 2d 365 (1963); Ind.: 1lider v.
Fisher, 217 N.E.2d 847 (1966); Mass.: Adamian v. Three Sons, Inc., 353 Mass. 498, 233
N.E.2d 18' (1968); Pa.: Jardine v. Upper Darby Lodge No. 1973, Inc., 413 Pa. 626, 198
A.2d 550 (1964) (after repeal of Pennsylvania's dram shop act). New Hampshire has al.
lowed a common law cause of action by an intoxicated person for a self-inflicted Injury:
Ramsey v. Anctil, 106 N.H. 375, 211 A.2d 900 (1965).
2247 Misc. 2d 381, 262 N.Y.S.2d 290 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
[Vol. 35
dude such an action, and that the legal rule is that the existence of a
statute does not prevent an action for common law negligence. Find-
ing nothing in the statute to preclude a common law action, the court then
confronted the common law rule of proximate cause, and with a tip of
the hat to Waynick and Rappaport, established a common law action co-
existent with the statutory action. The court recognized that the deci-
sion gave Berkeley duplicate causes of action, but said that a party should
not be restricted to a single remedy when others are available, especially
when the remedies differ on questiois of liability and damages. Although
the court did not indicate the reason behind Berkeley suing both under the
dram shop act and on a negligence theory, one can speculate that Berkeley
might have found it difficult to prove that the bartender had made an
illegal sale (a necessary element under the New York statute) ,24 while a
negligence action required proof merely of a negligent sale.
The difficulty with such reasoning is that most negligence cases de-
pend upon a violation'of a statutory duty not to serve liquor to an intoxi-
cated person as a basis of a recovery for negligence. The Berkeley court
stated: "[tlhe duty of the innkeeper to the public is evidenced by the fact
that it is illegal to serve an intoxicated person more alcohol."25  It thus
seems that recovery under the New York Dram Shop Act would require
fewer elements to be proved than in a negligence action. The negligence
action would require a showing that the sale by the bartender was the
proximate cause of the injury; the statutory action would only require a
showing that the intoxicated person injured plaintiff, and that the bar-
tender illegally served him liquor which contributed to his intokication.
The negligence action would require that the injury be reasonably fore-
seeable to the bartender; the statutory action would require no such test
of foreseeability.
Illinois courts have also confronted the issue of common law liability
in a dram shop act state. But in Colligan v. Cousar0 an Illinois court of
appeals specifically pointed out that under Illinois law the dram shop act
provides the only civil remedy against a seller of intoxicating liquor. The
Illinois Supreme Court had decided in 1961 that the legislature had in-
tended the Civil Damage Act remedy to be exclusive.2 T The significance
23 See W. PROssER, THE LAw OF ToRTs § 36 (4th ed. 1971).
24 See note 11 supra.
25 47 Misc. 2d at 384,262 N.Y.S.2d at 293.
26 38 ILL App. 2d 392, 187 N.E.2d 292 (1963).
' Cunningham v. Brown, 22 I1. 2d 23, 174 N.E.2d 153 (1961). The Illinois Supreme
Court said that when the dram shop act was enacted in 1872 no common law vendor liability
existed, but that the legislature created liability and had carefully limited its effect and
the damages available, in recognition of the statutory abrogation of common law principles.
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of the Colligan decision is that while acknowledging the supreme court's
decision, the Colligan court stated that .a common law remedy would exist
in Illinois if the dram shop act had not been enacted. A number of the com-
mentators have cited Colligan as deciding that common law vendor liabil-
ity exists in Illinois..2 ' This is not true. In Colligan the drinker bought
the liquor in Illinois, drove across the Indiana border and injured plain-
tiff 250 feet into Indiana territory. When plaintiff sued the vendor, the
court noted that the Illinois dram shop act does not apply extraterritorial-
ly to injuries occurring in other states..20  But since Indiana had not yet
decided the issue of vendor liability in 1963, the Illinois court applied the
rule that the common law of Indiana would be the same as the common
law of Illinois. However, Illinois had a dram shop act while Indiana did
not. Thus the court decided to determine what the common law of Illi-
nois would have been if no dram shop act had existed. This speculatory
device eliminated the need to confront the pre-emption problem, and the
court then proceeded to decide the case using the Rap paport rationale.
Common law liability will only be imposed on an Illinois vendor by an
Illinois court if the injury occurs in another state which has no dram shop
act and has not decided the question of vendor liability.8 0 There is no
common law vendor liability in Illinois for an injury occurring in Illinois.
The third approach to the question of common law vendor liability
in a dram shop act state is the Oregon approach, as formulated in Wiener
v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity.81 The Oregon
dram shop act limits the class of persons who can bring an action to the
wife, husband, parent or child of the intoxicated person to whom liquor
was given or sold. In a footnote the court noted the fact that the legis-
lature provided a statutory remedy for a very limited class of plain-
tiffs as an indication that the legislature did not intend the act to be the
sole civil remedy, citing Berkeley with approval. 2  The court was pre-
Thus the legislature intended not to create a remedy in addition to the common law remedy,
but an exclusive remedy beyond the common law and limited in scope.
2 8 See, e.g., Case Comment, 48 NOTRHE DAME LAWYER 709, 714 (1973) n. 34; Com
ment, Dram Shop Liability-A Judicial Response, 57 CAL. L. RBv. 995, 1005 (1969) n. 60,
29Accord: Waynick v. Chicago's Last Department Store, Inc., 269 F.2d 322 (7th CIr,
1959).
a0 Today Colligan would be decided under Indiana law, citing Elder v. Fisher, 217 N,.,2d
847 (1966), which established common law vendor liability in Indiana. In Rubitsky v,
Russo's Derby, Inc., 70 Ill. App. 2d 485, 216 N.E.2d 680 (2d Dist. 1966) Colliga was
held inapplicable when the injury occurred in Wisconsin, since Wisconsin courts have held
that no common law vendor liability exists. Colligan was further limited by Graham v,
General U. S. Grant Post No. 2665, 97 Ill. App. 2d 139, 239 N.E2d 856 (2d Dist. 1968),
which held that if the injury occurred in another state to an Illinois resident, the lllnols
dram shop act would apply and be an exclusive remedy.
81258 Ore. 632, 485 P.2d 18 (1971).
32258 Ore. at 638, 485 P.2d at 21, n. 2.
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2nted from following the New York rule established in Berkeley because
le facts in Wiener did not involve a vendor, but rather a social host. A
llege fraternity held a picnic and served liquor to the members, some
F whom were minors. After the party one of the members, a minor, was
;ked to furnish plaintiff, a guest at the party, a ride home in his automo-
ie. On the way home he crashed. The plaintiff was injured, and al-
!ged that the driver's intoxication caused the crash. Oregon's dram shop
-t dearly provided plaintiff no remedy. Since the dram shop act was
ot seen by the court as an exclusive remedy, the court found an action
L negligence:
The fraternity status as host and its direct involvement in serving the
liquor to Blair are sufficient to raise the duty, which we have been dis-
cussing, to refuse to serve alcohol to a guest when it would be unreason-
able under the circumstances to permit him to drink. The allegations
that Blair was a minor and that the fraternity ought to have known that
he would be driving after the party adequately charge the existence of
circumstances from which a jury might conclude that the fraternity's be-
havior was in fact unreasonable.33
dthough the Oregon courts have not decided a case in which a vendor's
ability at common law is the issue, the language used in Wriener is cer-
tinly broad enough to allow the word "vendor" to be substituted for
host.""
One other point was made by the Wiener court. The court said that
ae statute prohibiting the giving or making available. of liquor to a mi-
or3s was passed to protect the minor, and not to protect third persons
rom injury by an inebriated minor. The duty involved in a host liabil-
.y case is thus a common law duty, not a statutory duty.
The Kentucky approach to the issue is unique in that a Kentucky
ourt of appeals was able to find vendor liability in the absence of a dram
hop act without establishing a common law cause of action. Kentucky
as a statute prohibiting a sale or furnishing of liquor to a minor. 6 The
Latute is a penal statute, with fines and jail terms specified as penalties.
.entucky also has a general civil liability statute which states: "A person
a3258 Ore. at 643, 485 P.2d at 23.
34 Minnesota found a social host to be liable by construing its dram shop act to include
I persons, not just vendors, in Ross v. Ross, 294 Minn. 115, 200 N.W.2d 149 (1972),
holding which the restrictive language of the Oregon dram shop act denied to the Oregon
utrt. The Iowa Supreme Court also put social hosts under the old Iowa dram shop act
t Williams v. Klemesrud, 197 N.W.2d 614 (1972). However, since the facts in that
ise arose, the old act was repealed and replaced by a new Civil Damage Act which limits
ability to "licensees and permittees."
35 ORE. REV. STAT. § 471.410(2) (1971).
3 60KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 244.080 (1973).
37 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 244.990. .
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injured by the violation of any statute may recover from the offender such
damages as he sustained by reason of the violation, although a penalty or
a forfeiture is imposed for such violation. 88  In Pike v. George5 the
court found that a package store vendor could be liable for injuries caused
when the car in which plaintiff was riding crashed as a result of the driv-
er's intoxication. The driver was a minor, as was the plaintiff and they
had purchased a bottle of liquor from the defendant. Plaintiff alleged
that the defendant willfully and maliciously sold the liquor to minors,
knowing that they would immediately drink it and thereafter drive on
public highways. The court held that the plaintiff had stated a cause of
action under the general civil liability statute. Because the case had not
been tried, the court refused to consider the merits or to discuss the prob-
lem of proximate cause, other than to note that the problem existed, and
to indicate that a sale to a minor might create a presumption of proxi-
mate cause where a sale to an adult would not.'10 The implication which
the court raises in discussing the special status given minors by the legisla-
ture Is that minors have less legal responsibility than adults, and that their
lack of responsibility may call for imputing their wrongful conduct to an
adult who sells them liquor, or to extend the chain of proximate cause
from the minors to the vendor. The court cites the attractive nuisance
theory as an example of judicial recognition of the need for special pro-
tection of minors in view of their propensity to act irresponsibly.
This survey of the extent of common law vendor liability demonstrates
the fact that while six states without dram shop acts have established lia-
bility, only one state having a dram shop act (New York) has also found
a coexisting common law cause of action against a vendor for Injuries In-
flicted upon a person by an intoxicated customer. On the other hand, a
number of other states have considered the arguments In favor of such
liability and rejected them." Thus it cannot be said that a sweeping
trend toward common law vendor liability exists; rather, a respectable
line of precedent has been established and is available for use by courts In
sB Ky. Pms. STAT. ANN. § 446.070.
SD 434 SW.2d 626 (1968).
40 454 S.W.2d at 629.
41 See Parsons v. Jow, 480 P.2d 396 (Wyo. 1971) for a sampling of cases which refuse
to apply Rappapori in their states. McNally v. Addls, 317 N.Y.S.2d 137 (Sup. Ct, 1970)
ilso contains a hefty list of cases oh this point. Note also that McNttlly seems to say
that New York's position is unclear as to common law vendor liability; that court refused
to apply Berkeley to the facts ib McNally, even though the facts were sufficient to permit
the court to apply Berkeley. the New York Court of Appeals has not yet spokqn oh
the issue; in view of the apparent inconsistency between Berkeley and iMeNdily, the claim
that New York has adopted a common law action coexistent with its dram shop act must
be considered tentative.
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other states given facts in which the culpability of the vendor is particu-
larly egregious.
II. FINDING THE ELEMENTS OF NEGLIGENCE
In order to succeed in a common law negligence action, a plaintiff must
establish four elements: a duty or standard of conduct owed to the plain-
tiff, a breach of that duty, a causal connection between the breach and the
injury, and an actual loss. 42 From these elements arise two stubborn prob-
lems for courts considering vendor liability: the problem of duty and the
problem of proximate cause, neither of which can be elegantly solved. In
fact, it may have been the inability of nineteenth century courts to find
a logical means of explaining duty and proximate cause in this setting
which led to the common law rule that a vendor could not be liable to
third parties, and to the passage of dram shop acts during that period of
emphasis on logic and pattern in the law.
Today the same logical perplexities exist, yet some courts have been
able, as we have seen, to circumvent the problems by shifting their view-
point from that of a philosopher to that of a utilitarian. Instead of ex-
plaining why liability attaches, the courts may simply ask "Why not?"
after establishing liability.43 Finally, courts are willing to utilize such
logic-stretching devices as imputed negligence and a liberally-construed
doctrine of foreseeability in order to establish the negligence action.
There are several categories of people to whom a vendor may be said
to owe a duty. He may owe a duty to the customer he serves, to ensure
that the customer does not drink so much liquor as to impair his self-pro-
tective judgment. He may owe a duty to dependents of those customers
he serves, to protect the breadwinner from a self-inflicted injury sustained
while intoxicated, or illness from excessive intoxication. He may owe a
duty to all patrons in his tavern as business invitees, to protect them from
injury inflicted upon them by an intoxicated customer. He may owe a
duty to the world at large, to prevent an intoxicated patron from inflict-
ing damage and injuries not only within the tavern but also after leaving
the tavern. Each succeeding category named above extends the duty a bit
further, until the fourth and final category is reached, in which the only
limitation upon duty is the doctrine of foreseeability as applied to plain-
tiff's relationship to defendant.44 The clearest instance of duty is pre-
sented in a Kentucky case in which a patron boasted and wagered that he
42 W. PROSSER, supra note 3, at § 30.
4:3 E.g., Berkeley v. Park, 47 Misc.2d 381, 262 N.Y.S.2d 290 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
4 4 See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 281, Comment C (1965), which recognizes
the rule of Palsgraf v. Long Island R. R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928), applying
the doctrine of foreseeability to the issue of duty rather than proximate cause.
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could drink a quart of whiskey in one draught. 4' The bartender served
the required amount, the patron won the bet but died shortly thereafter.
The court held the bartender liable for serving liquor to the patron when
he knew or should have known that the patron's intended act would prob.
ably result in death or serious illness. From that point the court had little
difficulty in finding a cause of action in favor of the intoxicated victim's
wife for loss of services and support.
New Hampshire expanded this duty to include the protection of a pa-
tron on the premises from a self-inflicted injury while intoxicated in a
case in which the intoxicated patron slammed his fist on the bar, striking
a glass and causing a piece of glass to sever a nerve in his hand.Y' The
court therein stated that it was willing to accept Rappaport to the extent
of allowing the intoxicated patron to recover for his own injuries."
A vendor's duty toward other patrons upon the premises was cited by
the Ohio Supreme Court as a basis of its decision in Mason. This princi-
ple is stated as follows:
[A]n occupier of premises for business purposes may be subject to l1a.
bility for harm caused to such a business invitee by the conduct of third
persons that endangers the safety of such invitee, just as such occupier
may be subject to liability for harm caused to such invitee by any dan.
gerous condition of those premises.48
This.duty is, however, subject to a limitation of foreseeability: "Since the'
possessor is not an insurer of the visitor's safety, he is ordinarily under no
duty to exercise any care until he knows or has reason to know that the
acts of the third person are occurring or are about to occur."4
Thus, in Taggart v. Bitzenhofer 0 the intoxicated patron had placed
a pistol on the bar and threatened several other patrons; the bartender
had then served him liquor in spite of his unruly demeanor, threats, and
obvious intoxication. The vendor's duty to the other patrons on the prem-
ises seems close enough to the duty quoted above to base liability upon a
duty to a business invitee rather than a duty to the world at large not to
serve an intoxicated person.
The broadest duty which may arise is the duty owed to the world at
large not to threaten the safety of any member of the public by negli-
45 Nally v. Blandford, 291 S.W.2d 832 (Ky. 1956).
46 Ramsey v. Anctil, 106 N.H. 375, 211 A.2d 900 (1965).
47 However, the court also stated, that it saw no reason to ,prevent the vendor from
claiming plaintiff's contributory negligence in bec6ming intoxicated.
48Howard v. Rogers, 19.Ohio St. 2d 42, 47, 249 N.E.2d 804, 807 (1969).
49 Id., quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 344 Comment f.
GO 33 Ohio St. 2d 35, 294 N.E.2d 226 (1973), argued on the same day as fason before
the Ohio Supreme Court and decided on the basis of the Mason decision.
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gently serving liquor to an intoxicated person. This duty would thus ex-
tend to cases in which the injury is inflicted on a plaintiff after the intoxi-
cated person leaves the premises of the tavern. This situation occurs
most commonly when the intoxicated person attempts to drive an auto-
mobile after drinking and causes an accident.5 Finding a duty to pro-
tect people from the intoxicated person's conduct off the premises is much
more difficult than finding a duty to protect patrons on the premises. In
off-premises cases the vendor must reasonably foresee that an intoxicated
patron may cause injuries to others upon leaving the premises. In other
words, a vendor by serving liquor to an intoxicated patron must be per-
ceived by the court as creating an unreasonable risk that the intoxicated
patron will injure others after leaving the premises. Here the court can-
not sidestep the question by using the duty to protect business invitees to
establish liability,52 or by simply answering in the affirmative and then
denying recovery because of contributory negligence or assumption of
risk,53 since these issues do not arise in an off-premises injury to an inno-
cent plaintiff.
If a duty to the public at large arises, it must be because serving liquor
to an intoxicated person creates an unreasonable risk to members of the
public. But balancing the burden of prevention against the risk indicates
that the burden is not as light as some courts seem to believe. A bar-
tender who shuts off the tap on a significant number of his patrons out of
fear of tort liability will not have a booming business for long. The
primary aim of a vendor is to please his customers and thus gain their
patronage. Thus the burden of prevention is heavy, especially when a
jury fortified with the wisdom of hindsight sets out to decide that a ven-
dor had a duty to cease serving a particular patron (who later commits
the injurious act which prompts the jury's finding)."' The burden may be
a result of the fact that the test of the level of intoxication necessary to
create liability is unknown.
If a duty to the public at large arises because serving liquor to an in-
toxicated person is dangerous, it must be because an intoxicated person
is dangerous. Yet public policy is already established that the risk of
5 1 E.g., Berkeley v. Park, 47 Misc. 2d 381, 262 N.Y.S.2d 290 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
52 E.g., Taggart v. Bitzenhofer, 33 Ohio St. 2d 35, 294 N.E.2d 226 (1973).
53 E.g., McNally v. Addis, 317 N.Y.S.2d 157 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
54 The foreseeability of a risk is measured not by reconstructed foresight, but by using
hindsight to determine whether the results were extraordinary. See Leposki v. Railway
Express Agency, Inc., 297 F.2d 849 (3d Cir. 1962); Dellwo v. Pearson, 259 Minn. 452,
107 N.W.2d 859 (1961) (stating that hindsight replaces foreseeability as a proximate cause
test); RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 435.
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intoxication is an acceptable risk; otherwise the sale of liquor would be
prohibited. 5
Advocates of common law vendor liability argue, on the other hand,
that public policy supports liability because the duty to the public has been
established by a criminal statute?° All fifty states have statutory provi-
sions prohibiting the sale of liquor to an intoxicated person, providing
criminal penalties for a violation. Whether such statutes raise a common
law duty to the public at large sufficient to establish negligence per so
for a violation is an unsettled question. Some states consider a violation
of a statute to be evidence of negligence; others consider it to raise a re-
buttable presumption of negligence; and still others consider it to be negli-
gence per se. 7
The Ohio common law rule is that if a statute requires a specific act
for the protection of others, the failure to perform the act is negligence
per se. But if a statute expresses a rule of conduct generally, liability must
be determined by the test of due care." The statute in question falls on
the borderline of the test, since the required act is specified but the cir-
cumstances which require the act involve a jury consideration of whether
due care was exercised in determining the degree of intoxication of the
patron.
However, in Ohio the question of common law negligence based upon
violation of a statute need not be confronted, since Ohio, like Kentucky,
has a statute which provides for a civil recovery by anyone injured by a
criminal act.59 Thus Ohio may choose to adopt the Kentucky approach
to the duty issue stated in Pike. The statute has the effect of establishing
a legal duty toward the public at large to obey every statute for which
criminal penalties may be assessed. In Ohio, the duty to refuse to sell
liquor to an intoxicated person is clearly established by statute.
However, this statutory analysis does not settle the issue of proximate
cause. The violation of a legal duty may be negligence, but negligence
is not actionable unless the negligent act was the proximate cause of the
55 Meade v. Freeman, 462 P.2d 54 (Idaho 1969); Garcia v. H-argrove, 176 N.W.2d
566 (Wis. 1970). These cases state that the legislature has recognized that the use of
liquor is an accepted part of society, that it is not a tort to sell intoxicating liquor to
P- ^"-e-bodied man, and that whatever responsibility exists for an injury falls upon the
drinker.
6u E.g. OHIO REV. CODE §§ 4301.22 (B), (C).
57 57 AM. JUR. 2d Negligence §§ 234, 244 (1971).
58 Eisenhuth v. Moneyhon, 161 Ohio St. 367, 119 N.E.2d 440 (1954) syllabus #3.
59 OHIo REv. CODE § 1.16: "Any one injured in person or property by a criminal
act may recover full damages in a civil action, unless specifically excepted by low, No
record of a conviction, unless obtained by confession in open court, shall be used as evldence
in a civil action brought for such purposes."
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injury.0 It is the proximate cause element which has been the traditional
roadblock to common law vendor liability. The vendor's sale is but a
remote cause, while the patron's act of drinking is the proximate cause.61
This theory arises from the normative assumption that a person should not
be able to relieve himself from legal responsibility for his acts by becom-
ing intoxicated. 2 Of course, it is not necessary to relieve the intoxicated
person of liability in order to establish vendor liability, but the need to
allow vendor liability diminishes if the intoxicated patron is liable, and
since the vendor is adequately controlled by criminal penalties, the line
between proximate and remote causation seems to be conveniently drawn
between consumer and vendor.
The remoteness of the sale as causation can also be seen in applying
the "but for" test of proximate cause: "the actor's negligent conduct is
not a substantial factor in bringing about harm t6 another if the harm
could have been sustained even if the actor had not been negligent."'
Assume hypothetically that A enters a tavern and purchases and consumes
a number of drinks. At a certain point B, the bartender, notices that A
is visibly intoxicated. If B refuses to serve A another drink, and A there-
upon departs from the premises, A is still visibly intoxicated and likely to
constitute a social threat. The vendor's duty to refuse service does not
arise until the patron has already become visibly intoxicated. Now as-
sume instead that B serves A a drink after A has become visibly intoxi-
cated. A, after leaving the tavern, injures C. Can it be said that "but for"
the drink served after A had become visibly intoxicated, the injury to C
would not have occurred?
Those courts which have determined that a sale is the proximate cause
have done so on the foreseeability test: if the vendor could reasonably fore-
see that his conduct would create an unacceptable risk of injury to some-
one, his conduct would be deemed a proximate cause of any injury fall-
ing within the scope of the risk. Nor would the patron's consumption
constitute an intervening cause of such extraordinary import as to relieve
the vendor from responsibility for proximate causation, when viewed in
the white light of hindsight. 4
The question of proximate cause is not really an issue filled with
clashes of legal principles, but is rather a simple question of judgment.
For example, an obviously inebriated man drives his car up to a carry-out,
60 REsTATEM NT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 430; Cincinnati Street Ry. Co. v. Murray,
53 Ohio St. 570,42 N.E. 596 (1895) syllabus #3.
61 See note 2 supra.
02 W. PROSSER, supra note 3, at § 32.
63 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 432(1).
64 See note 54 supra.
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throws out an empty bottle, enters the carry-out, and says he needs a re-
fill. Or a man enters a tavern, lays a gun on the bar, and says "I need a
couple of drinks before I shoot Joe." These are relatively easy cases in
which to find a duty and proximate cause based upon foreseeability"'m
Not so simple is the more usual circumstance in which a regular patron
of a tavern causes an autofiobile crash, injuring another party who sues
the tavern owner, or in which the patron leaves the tavern and gets into
a fight down the street. Should the vendor be required to foresee these
consequences? Are all injuries caused by drunkenness deemed foresee,
able merely because drunkenness may result in unpredictable conduct?' "
It is probable that one of the major reasons courts have been hesitant
to permit common law vendor liability is the difficulty in determining the
level of intoxication required to subject the vendor to liability. At what
level of intoxication should the vendor realize that the next drink will
create an unreasonable risk? The traffic laws state that a driver is danger-
ous when his blood alcohol level exceeds .10 percent.07 Yet this level is
not easily detectable in many people by mere observation. A vendor
would have to require each patron to puff into a breathanalyzer before
each round, or to walk a line painted on the floor of the bar to meet such
a standard of responsibility. The theory behind the dram shop acts ap-
pears to be that at a certain level of intoxication a person loses the ability
to refuse the next drink, and that further drinking should thus be blamed
on the vendor. But the point at which the patron loses his judgment,
or his ability to recognize his own limitations, is even less obvious to the
vendor than the patron. Furthermore, neither the common law states
nor the dram shop acts have been able to define satisfactorily the test for
a court's determination that the vendor should have refused service. Is
the "visibly intoxicated" test practicable? Would it not be a legitimate
complaint for a vendor to say: "Most of the people in my place look like
they've had a few; am I supposed to throw them all out?"
Ohio's blacklisting scheme is an obvious attempt to avoid the uncer-
tainty of common law liability by providing an absolutely certain test:
if the patron's name appears on the blacklist sent to each tavern by the
65 In fact, the companion case to Mason argued before the Ohio Supreme Court on
the same day and decided on the basis of Mason did involve a patron brandishing a pistol and
threatening other customers. Was the court moved to decide Mason as they did because of
the facts in Taggart? Did the court confuse the facts in the two cases, resulting in a syl-
labus proclaiming liability for on-premises injury in a case in which the injury occurred off
the premises?
0 6 See Meade v. Freeman, 462 P.2d 54, 60 (Idaho 1969), in which the court suggests
that some judges are ". . . unable to disenthrall themselves of the lurking suspicion that
liquor in and of itself is evil."
G7 OHio REv. CODE § 4511.19(B) (1973).
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Department of Liquor Control, he cannot be served at all, and the vendor
is liable in tort for any injuries arising from the ensuing intoxication. The
burden of complying with this statute is as simple as discovering the iden-
tity of each patron-it is no burden at all as to regular customers. How-
ever, the utility of the statute in eliminating uncertainty is only realized
if the statute is deemed to pre-empt the field of vendor liability. Finding
a common law cause of action coexistent with the blacklisting statute
would not only introduce the uncertainty which the blacklist prevents, but
also renders the blacklist statute an unneeded device.
In Robinson v. Stilgenbauer s the court indicated that it might be will-
ing to find liability if the person served were a known habitual drunkard,
even if the person had not been blacklisted."9 The willingness of the
court to do so may be attributed to the fact that the foreseeability test of
negligence wbuld be much easier to administer if the vendor could be
said to have known that a particular patron tends to drink excessively and
becomes dangerous when drunk. The burden on the vendor would not
be so heavy in such a case, although this holding would render the black-
listing statute obsolete, since blacklisting would then arise from reputation
rather than administrative action.
Although the blacklisting statute was passed at a time when a negli-
gence action against a vendor by a third party was universally denied,
thus showing legislative intent to restrict civil actions to injuries caused by
blacklisted persons, the apparent willingness of the Ohio Supreme Court
to find liability in other situations may be explained by the fact that the
blacklisting statute does not work very well. Presently the blacklist con-
tains only 500 names, many of which have remained on the list for a long
period of time, since the Department of Liquor Control has no procedure
for removing a name from the list. The Department receives only one
or two requests for listing each week. The Department is not adding
names to the list at this time because the recent United States Supreme
Court decision of Wisconsin v. Constantineat,7  makes the procedure
whereby people have been blacklisted without notice and a hearing un-
constitutional. Although complying with Constantineau will require
merely a change in Departmental procedure, the larger infirmities of the
statute will remain. Apparently few people are willing to turn in the
names of husbands, relatives, friends, or constituents for blacklisting. Re-
ported cases concerning blacklist actions are few in number, especially in
6814 Ohio St. 2d 165, 237 N.E.2d 136 (1968).
69 Plaintiff had conceded upon defendants motion for summary judgment that the patron
had not been blacklisted, but plaintiff had alleged in the complaint that the patron was a
known habitual drunkard.
70 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
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comparison with states which have more liberal dram shop acts. Al.
though the paucity of suits under the blacklist statute may be attributable
to the effectiveness of the act, in that bartenders in Ohio never serve to
blacklisted people, it is more likely that so few persons are blacklisted
that virtually none of the injuries caused in Ohio by intoxicated persons
are actionable under the statute.
The expansion of the blacklisting statute or the establishment of com-
mon law vendor liability in Ohio are developments not necessarily re-
quired by the present paucity of lawsuits against vendors. The controlling
question, of course, is whether more such lawsuits are socially desirable,
This is a question of policy for which two affirmative arguments can be
presented. First, establishing liability would deter vendors from selling to
intoxicated persons. Second, compensation would be available from a
more solid financial entity (the tavern) than just the drunkard himself,
The deterrence argument seems to have little force. Already in the
Ohio Revised Code is a criminal provision providing for a maximum six
month jail term and $300 fine, plus loss of license, to any vendor who
sells to an intoxicated person.7' The addition of tort liability would
seem to offer minimal additional deterrence, especially with insurance
available. On the other hand, permitting a common law civil action may
be the best means of enforcing the prohibition against serving intoxicated
persons. Few taverns lose licenses for serving intoxicated persons, yet
heavily intoxicated people are not uncommon occurrences. The prohibi-
tory statute, like the common law civil action, suffers from a serious prob-
lem of vagueness in interpretation, and police are reluctant to second-
guess the vendor's judgment of who is intoxicated within the meaning of
the statute. The seeming reluctance of the state to enforce the penal pro.
visions might indicate that allowing the civil action would indeed add de-
terrence to the present system.
The compensation argument is stronger. If tort liability were such
that every vendor would feel insurance necessary, compensation would be
assured to those injured by senselessly intoxicated persons. Furthermore,
the costs of damages and injuries caused by intoxication would be borne
equally by those who drink-the customers of the'tavern-since the cost
of insurance would be reflected in the price of drinks. The negative side
of compensation also exists-using negligence lawsuits is an inefficient
method of compensation, since a large slice of the recovery must pay at-
torney fees, and since a plaintiff would still have the difficult task of prov-
ing that the vendor was negligent.72
7 1 OHIO REV. CODE §§ 4301.22, 4301.25, 4301.99.
72Note that most dram shop acts eliminate the necessity of proving vendor negligence,
though specifying narrow circumstances in which the vendor may not serve a potion.
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III. CONCLUSION
The greatest attribute of the negligence form of action in tort law is
that it is flexible; it operates to settle grievances in many different fact set-
tings, and is always available to provide redress for injuries suffered in
situations never before encountered by the law. But in factual settings
in which the same relationships, duties and dangers are commonly con-
fronted and in which patterns of behavior are predictable from experience,
the negligence action suffers from a lack of efficiency. Thus in the areas
of industrial accidents and (recently) automobile accidents, the trend
away from the inefficiencies of negligence actions is apparent.
Liquor control has since the repeal of Prohibition been a highly regu-
lated field. An entire chapter of the Ohio Revised Code is devoted to
liquor control, and a state agency is charged solely with enforcing the li-
quor control laws. The liquor control statutes are sufficiently detailed
that the vendor is even told what size sign he may place in the window of
his tavern, and how the taps on his beer kegs are to be labelled. The
courts are not entering a legislative void when considering common law
vendor liability. In a matter which involves so many policy questions
the legislature is much better equipped than the courts to determine the
need for vendor liability.78
73 The Idaho Supreme Court in Meade v. Freeman, 462 P.2d 54, 59-60 (1969) said:
We believe that if liability, as sought by appellants here, is to be established it
should be done forthrightly by the legislature in the form of a dram shop act,
rather than by judicial construction ....
We are being asked to single out a particular type of business, which in every
other aspect is legitimate and respectable, for the imposition of a liability otherwise
unknown in the law. This, for the purpose of alleviating a major social ill in this
country, that of mixing the two ingredients-alcohol and automobile. If such is to
be done, it should be done by the legislature wherein all of the policy considera-
tions can and should be carefully weighed and from which, perchance, liability of
the type sought here will become a reality with the enactment of a dram shop act.
The brief for Appellee in Mason (p. 19) argues that liquor vendors are in fact relieved
from responsibility for injuries caused by their sales, while other vendors must assume such
responsibility. But liquor vendor cases are not product liability cases. Product liability
negligence would arise against a liquor vendor if he were to sell liquor which was contami-
nated or unreasonably capable of injury, taking into account the fact that the sale of liquor
is not unreasonably dangerous per se.
Judge Rutherford in dissenting from the Court of Appeals decision in Mason noted that
Certainly the common law need not remain static. It arose from court decisions
and although courts should be reluctant to depart from rules which have been long.
standing it is within their province, when change has not been controlled by leg-
islative enactment, to change such law if change is necessary to meet changing con-
ditions of society.
Where there has been a legislative enactment, the courts have generally held
that the extent and condition of civil liability are clearly within the power of the
creator, the legislature, with the only exception being where injury has resulted from
a willful and intentional tort.
35 Ohio App. 2d at 44.
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Appellant's brief in Mason suggests that the legislature is the proper
body to establish vendor liability and suggests several means of establish-
ing such liability.74 The most practical of his suggestions is that the ven-
dor be held secondarily liable for uncompensated injuries after a recov-
ery has been obtained from the intoxicated person. Appellant also sug-
gests that the New York dram shop act provides a good model for estab-
lishing a broader range of liability. Unquestionably, a modern dram shop
act, if deemed necessary by the legislature, should include (1) strict lia-
bility for injuries caused by intoxication arising from an illegal sale (as In
New York), thus eliminating proximate cause problems; (2) a provision
establishing strict liability for sale to a known drunkard (a more flexible
substitute for the blacklisting scheme presently existing) with specific
tests for establishing the identity of such persons before the sale; and (3)
mandatory liability insurance for all taverns in such amount as to ensure
full compensation to injured parties.
Today in Ohio a vendor is liable for on-premises injuries because of
his duty to protect business invitees. The Mason case was decided on the
basis of that doctrine in spite of the fact that the injury occurred off the
premises. Because the syllabus in that case discusses on-premises liability
only, it can be said that the Ohio Supreme Court'has not yet established
off-premises liability. Hopefully the Mason case will be appealed again
after trial to allow the Court to clear up the conflict between the facts and
the syllabus in the case. Hopefully the legislature will also reconsider
the present state of dram shop liability and by legislative action provide
the court with a fresh statement of intent as to the need for vendor liabil-
ity.
Robert Conley Kahd
74 Brief for Appellant at 24.
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